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The combined effects of collective beliefs and individual stubbornness in the dynamic of a public
debate are investigated using the Galam sequential probabilistic model of opinion dynamics. The
study is focused on pair interactions for which the bias produced by collective beliefs is the decisive
factor to win the debate. The current value of that bias is a fixed external parameter. It is a
constant of the problem not given to change. In contrast, stubbornness is an individual property.
It results from external ingredients, which are susceptible to be modified during the debate. More
precisely, giving some beliefs we determine the required stubbornness to oppose its associated bias in
the debate outcome. The results shed a new and counter intuitive light on paradoxical outcomes of
sensitive issues, which are discussed in the public. The case of the global warming issue is discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sociophysics is nowadays a main stream of research
in physics [1–4]. It covers numerous topics of social sci-
ences including opinion dynamics, which has attracted
a great deal of research [5–17]. Indeed, public opinion
is a key feature to determine which decisions should be
taken by policy-makers in modern democratic societies.
It puts the understanding of its underlining mechanisms
at the top priority among current major challenges. Any
progress could have drastic effects on the way to tackle
sensitive issues to which the global world is confronted.
In most bimodal opinion models the dynamics follows
some deterministic flow, whose direction is determined
by the existence of two attractors separated by a tipping
threshold. The initial public supports are thus instru-
mental to determine the eventual outcome of the associ-
ated public debate. For each opinion, the major issue is
to start the debate from an initial support beyond its tip-
ping threshold. In some cases, only one single attractor
drives the opinion dynamics [18].
While all discrete models are characterized by a spe-
cific update rule, it was sown that all of them belong to
one single probabilistic sequential scheme [19]. This ap-
proach was given some credit in 2005 with the successful
prediction of a highly improbable outcome of a politi-
cal vote [11]. Moreover the prediction was made several
months ahead of the actual vote against the prediction
of all polls and analyses [20].
The key factor to this prediction was the use of collec-
tive beliefs to account for possible local doubt of agents
discussing the issue. For a group of even size at a tie,
Galam model attributes the choice to each opinion with
a respective probability k and (1− k). The value of k is
a fixed constant not susceptible to be modified since it is
the result of a long accumulation of the cultural traits of
a social group.
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It embodies the collective beliefs of agents by produc-
ing a bias in a local group when the agents are having a
doubt about which opinion to adopt. Using a local ma-
jority rule for individual opinion updates, a doubt arises
at a tie for an even size group [11]. However for pair
groups majority rule does not apply and k is the unique
parameter, which determines the final outcome of the
dynamics.
In parallel, the existence of stubbornness is an indi-
vidual feature, which results from external ingredients.
Given some knowledge and information an agent get per-
suaded to hold the true choice and thus becomes inflexi-
ble, i.e., it is no longer open to an eventual opinion shift.
However, in contrast to collective beliefs, the ingredients
on which the inflexibility is built can be weakened or dis-
missed during the debate. Accordingly, the current frac-
tion of inflexibles is an external parameter, which can be
modified, although it is not easily done.
In this paper we focus on pair interactions to determine
the proportion of inflexibles, which is needed to oppose
the bias produced by collective beliefs. More precisely,
giving some beliefs we determine the required stubborn-
ness to oppose its associated bias in the debate outcome.
Simultaneously, it is seen how to amplify that collective
bias by producing inflexibles along the same direction.
The challenge is for each opinion to succeed in locating
the unique attractor of the dynamics above fifty percent.
Then the debate spontaneously guarantees its victory
even if starting from a very low initial support in the
public. Associated conditions are determined quantita-
tively.
The results shed a new and counter intuitive light on
paradoxical outcomes of sensitive issues, which are dis-
cussed in the public. It provides hints on how to design
winning strategies in public issues. The case of the global
warming issue is discussed [22–28].
2II. MODELING OPINION INTERACTIONS
GIVEN A SOCIO-PYSCHOLOGICAL FRAME
We study a public issue for which two competing opin-
ions A and B are available. Each agent does hold one of
them. For a group of N agents, selecting randomly an
agent at time t, pt denotes the probability that this agent
shares opinion A and (1 − pt) is the probability that it
holds opinion B.
A. Internal versus external effects
We consider that two different mechanisms are driving
the opinion individual making off. One is external and
includes the media, the available information, personal
values and education. It acts directly on the agent. The
second mechanism is internal to the group. It embodies
the outcome of discussions about the actual issue among
the group agents. In reality, both mechanisms are active
during a public debate but with different time scales. The
external effect is episodic and irregular while the inter-
nal one is sequential and regular. Here we focus on the
internal mechanism, i. e., the internal driving dynam-
ics of the public debate, assuming the external effect has
been activated once prior to the time the public debate
is launched.
We make the hypothesis that at some time t = 0 the
proportions p0 and (1−p0) of agents sharing respectively
opinions A and B are the net result of the external effect.
They can be evaluated using polls. At that time the in-
ternal mechanism is turned on while the first one is cut of.
We then focus on the time evolution of the A and B pro-
portions at a series of discrete times t = 1, 2, 3...n which
are produced by the interactions among agents. Indeed,
while holding a given opinion, agents argue among them
to validate their own choice. The process is monitored by
local discussion which involve a few agents, most often in
pairs.
B. Floater versus inflexible agents
Two types of agents are involved in the present model.
Most are characterized as floaters, which are open-
minded. Given significant counter arguments, a floater is
inclined to shift its current opinion from A to B and vice
versa. In contrast, there exist agents who are stubborn.
Whatever argument is given to them, they do stick to
their current opinion. To avoid a derogatory terminol-
ogy we denote a stubborn agent as inflexible.
Inflexibility is grounded on external ingredients related
to the issue. It could be claims that one of the two com-
peting opinions A and B has been proven to be correct
scientifically, let us say, opinion A. While the claims are
available to every agent, only a fraction of them takes
them for granted. These very agents become inflexibles
since for them the issue has been settled with opinion
A being the correct one. On this basis, no argument
from other agents neither their own belief could trigger
an opinion change. It is an individual property.
However, these external ingredients can be modified
during the debate at the macroscopic level with the pub-
lication of new results or the discovery of new facts. It
might then turn some inflexibles to become floaters and
vice versa.
The respective densities of stubbornness a and b for
each opinion A and B obey the constrains 0 ≤ a ≤ 1,
0 ≤ b ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ a + b ≤ 1 and can also be evaluated
using polls. Therefore at time t, we have pt supporters
of opinion A of which a are stubborn and (pt − a) are
floaters. For opinion B it is (1 − pt) supporters b are
stubborn and (1− pt − b) floaters. Accordingly the total
proportion of floaters is (1 − a − b). We also have a ≤
pt ≤ 1− b.
C. The role of beliefs on a free choice making
In addition to have two kind of agents, floaters and in-
flexibles, we introduce the existence of collective beliefs
within the population. Shared by all agents, these beliefs
may be heterogeneous and normally do not intervene in
the internal discussion among agents. However, in case
a group of discussing agents reach a local state of doubt
about the issue at stake with as much convincing argu-
ments for opinion A as for opinion B, the collective beliefs
are evoked to dispel that doubt. The opinion A or B in
adequacy with the beliefs is selected by the agents in the
local doubting group.
To account for this background psychological effect we
denote k the probability that a doubt yields to select
opinion A against B and (1−k) for B against A. The value
of k is a function of the group psyscho-sociological frame
and varies from one group to another with 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. It
is the average result of the distributed beliefs within the
whole group.
In case of a political change, most beliefs favor to pre-
serve the status quo in case of a doubt about the benefit
of a change. Accordingly couple of people sharing dif-
ferent opinions are expected to vote for the This effect
has been corroborated from a 2004 data analysis from the
American presidential election to study the marriage gap,
i.e. the difference in voting for Bush and Kerry between
married and unmarried people [15].
D. Monitoring the local opinion dynamics
To implement the global dynamics driven by local dis-
cussions among agents we assume that all agents are dis-
tributed randomly by groups of size L, which is restricted
here to L = 2, i.e., only pair interactions are considered.
Within each pair when both agents share the same opin-
ion nothing happens with AA→ AA, Aa→ Aa, aa→ aa
3and BB → BB, Bb → Bb, bb → bb where A and B de-
note stubborn agents holding opinion respectively A and
B with a and b being the corresponding floaters. Oth-
erwise the agents are supporting opposite views. In this
case several configurations occur with the following out-
comes and the permuted ones :
Ab → Aa
aB → aB
ab → aa


with probability k (1)
when at a tie collective beliefs favor opinion A and
Ab → Ab
aB → bB
ab → bb


with probability (1− k) (2)
when at a tie collective beliefs favor opinion B. Last case
AB → AB (3)
occurs at a tie where nothing happens due to mutual
stubbornness of both agents no matter the collective be-
liefs.
Given a density pt at time t, calculating the proba-
bility of occurrence of above each configuration, we can
evaluate the new density pt+1 of agents sharing opinion
A at time (t+ 1) after one update as,
pt+1 = (1−2k)p
2
t+{1−(1−2k)−a(1−k)−bk}pt+a(1−k) ,
(4)
which can be rewritten in the more convenient form,
pt+1 = αp
2
t + {1− α− β − γ}pt + β , (5)
where α ≡ (1 − 2k), β ≡ a(1 − k), γ ≡ bk with the asso-
ciated constraints −1 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
III. THE DRASTIC EFFECT OF PAIR
INTERACTIONS IN OPINION DYNAMICS
Assuming the external parameters a, b, k are given we
now study the opinion dynamics driven by a series of
repeated updates monitored by successive redistributions
of all agents in random pairs. Starting from an initial
proportion pt = p0 at the initial time t = 0 we get the
series p0 → p1 → p2... → pn after n opinion updates
where Eq. (5) is used at each time.
The strategic question is to determine if the public
debate reaches a stable state after a finite number n of
updates, which in turn becomes the democratic expres-
sion of the public about the discussed issue. As such it
can used by policy makers to justify the implementation
of new regulations.
To investigate the dynamics obtained from Eq. (5)
we solve the associated fixed point Equation pt+1 = pt,
which yields the two solutions,
p1,2 =
1
2α
{
α+ β + γ ±
√
−4αβ + (α+ β + γ)2
}
, (6)
provided α 6= 0.
A. The case of balanced collective beliefs
When collective beliefs are balanced or are not acti-
vated, we have k = 1/2, which is equivalent to α = 0.
Either both agents keep unchanged their opinions or both
adopt either A or B with the same probability, which on
average results in a null effect. From the ties, an equal
number of floaters adopt respectively opinions A and B,
making Eq. (5) to become,
pt+1 = {1− β − γ}pt + β , (7)
which yields the fixed point Equation p(a+ b) = a.
When a+ b 6= 0 there exists one single attractor p∗ =
a/(a+ b), meaning that initial conditions for floaters are
irrelevant to determine the final outcome of the debate.
If a > b, opinion A wins the debate and reciprocally for
a < b.
One case with a = 0.10 and b = 0.20 is exhibited in
Figure (1). The fixed point p∗ = a/(a+ b) = 1/3 < 1/2
monitors the opinion dynamics. Any initial condition
ends up to a A victory at a stable proportion of one
third of agents in favor of A and two third in favor of B.
The situation is illustrated with an initial support of pt =
70% in favor of opinion A, which is shown to shrink to
one third with eventually a B victory. Only five updates
are enough to reverse the majority with the series p0 =
0.70, p1 = 0.645, p2 = 0.598, p3 = 0.558, p4 = 0.525, p5 =
0.496. One more update accentuates the result with p6 =
0.472.
Increasing the proportion of stubbornness on the A
side by fifty percent at a = 0.15 with still b = 0.20 the
associated series yields p5 = 0.532 upholding now the A
initial majority status. However three additional updates
leads to p8 = 0.487. On the contrary to start with a
much lower support would not have changed the final
result. What matters here is only the relative strength
of stubbornness.
In the case of absence of stubbornness with a = b = 0
Eq. (7) writes pt+1 = pt making any value of pt a fixed
point. The dynamics does not modify the proportion of
respective support for A and B with every agent being
a floater. The associated diagonal straight line is also
shown in Figure (1).
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FIG. 1: The variation of pt+1 is exhibited as a function of pt
from a = 0.10 to 1− b = 0.80 for k = 1/2, a = 0.10, b = 0.20.
There exists one single attractor p∗ = a/(a+ b) = 1/3 < 1/2.
An initial support of 70% in favor of opinion A is found to
end up with a victory of opinion B only after five updates. At
the attractor only one third of the population is still holding
opinion A. The case k = 1/2, a = b = 0 is also shown with
the diagonal straight line pt+1 = pt with p varying from 0
to 1. There, every point is an attractor since the opinion
proportions are invariant under the opinion dynamics process.
B. Unbalanced collective beliefs
When a population shares heterogenous beliefs we have
k 6= 1/2 ⇐⇒ α 6= 0 making Eq. (5) to exhibit the two
fixed points given by Eq. (6). However to be valid, the
solutions must obey a ≤ p1,2 ≤ 1− b since they represent
the proportions of each opinion with respective densities
of stubbornness a and b. We thus need to determine the
ranges of α, β, γ for which this constraint is fulfilled for
each one of the solutions.
The p1 solution
Starting with p1 it happens to be more practical to
look first at 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1 instead of a ≤ p1 ≤ 1 − b. Two
cases are to discriminated:
(i) When α > 0 ⇐⇒ 0 ≤ k < 1/2 the constraint
is violated with p1 > 1 in the range k 6= 0 and b 6=
0. However p1 = 1 at k = 0 or and at b = 0. Three
combinations are possible. The first one, k = 0 and b 6= 0,
is not possible since then p1 = 1 > 1 − b. The second
one, k 6= 0 and b = 0, is possible only when k ≤ ka ≡
(1− a)/(2− a) for which p1 = 1 ≤ 1− b = 1. For k > ka
we have p1 = a(1− k)/(1− 2k)> 1. The last case, k = 0
and b = 0, is also relevant since there p1 = 1 ≤ 1− b = 1.
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FIG. 2: The fixed point p1 as a function of k for a = 0 and
b = 0.10. The part p1 = 1 is not physical since p1 must obey
p1 ≤ 1 − b = 0.90. The part p1 = 0 is valid for kb ≤ k ≤ 1
with kb ≈ 0.526 since we need to satisfy p1 ≥ a = 0.
Therefore p1 = 1 is a valid fixed point for b = 0 in the
range 0 ≤ k ≤ ka with the additional constraint ka < 1/2
due to α > 0, which implies a > 0.
(ii) For α < 0 ⇐⇒ 1/2 < k ≤ 1 we found p1 < 0
for a 6= 0 and k 6= 1 making it non physical in this
range. On the other hand p1 = 0 at k = 1 or and at
a = 0. Three combinations are again possible. When
k = 1 and a 6= 0 it is dismissed as non physical since then
p1 = 0 < a. The case a = 0 and k 6= 1 is possible only for
k ≥ kb ≡ 1/(2−b) since otherwise p1 = 1+bk/(1−2k) < 0
when k < kb. Last case k = 1 and a = 0 is also valid
with p1 = 0 ≥ a = 0. The fixed point p1 = 0 is thus valid
at a = 0 in the range kb ≤ k ≤ 1 with the additional
constraint kb > 1/2 due to α < 0, which requires b > 0.
Joining above results we conclude that p1 is a valid
fixed point only when stubbornness does not exist on one
side and within some limited range of collective beliefs,
which yields three cases.
(1) For a = 0, p1 = 0 with collective beliefs restricted to
the range kb ≤ k ≤ 1 with b > 0 where kb ≈ 0.526.
Figure (2) shows one case with b = 0.10.
(2) For b = 0 we have p1 = 1 with collective beliefs being
restricted to the range 0 ≤ k ≤ ka with a > 0
where ka ≈ 0.474. Figure (3) shows one case with
a = 0.10.
(3) For any other values of (a, b, k) the fixed point p1 is
non physical.
While no stubbornness is required on one side, it is
worth noticing that simultaneously at least an infinitesi-
mal proportion of stubbornness is required on the other
side. Otherwise to have both a = 0 and b = 0 make
ka = kb = 1/2 which is exclude here. In the vicin-
ity of no stubbornness with a ≈ 0 and b ≈ 0, we have
ka ≈ 1/2 − a/4 and kb ≈ 1/2 + b/4. When a 6= 0 and
b 6= 0 the fixed point p1 is always non physical as can
be seen in Figure (4) where one case with a = 0.10 and
b = 0.20.
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FIG. 3: The fixed point p1 as a function of k for a = 0.10
and b = 0. The part p1 = 1 is valid only in the range 0 ≤
k ≤ ka ≈ 0.474 since p1 must obey p1 ≤ 1 − b = 1. The
value p1 = 0 at k = 1 is not physical since we need to satisfy
p1 ≥ a = 0.1.
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FIG. 4: The fixed points p1,2 as a function of k for a = 0.10
and b = 0.20. The p1 solution is seen to be always unphysical
since it p1 = 1 > 1 − b = 0.90 and p1 = 0 < a = 0.10. The
two extreme points at k = 0 and k = 1 are exhibited as full
circles. In contrast p2 satisfies 0.10 ≤ p2 ≤ 0.90 for the full
range 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. The full square located on p2 shows the
value kc at which p2 = 1/2, i.e., A wins the majority when
k > kc and looses the debate for k < kc.
The p2 solution
To be valid, p2 given by Eq. (6) must obey a ≤ p2 ≤
1 − b. The first condition p2 ≤ 1 − b is equivalent to
(1 − k)b(1 − a − b) ≥ 0, which is always satisfied since
(1− k) ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 and (1− a− b) ≥ 0. The equality p2 =
1− b is obtained for k = 1 or and b = 0 or and a+ b = 1.
The other constraint p2 ≥ a yields ka(1−a−b) ≥ 0. The
conditions k = 0 or and a = 0 or and a + b = 1 yields
p2 = a. Last case a = 1 − b makes true simultaneously
both equalities p2 = a and p2 = 1 − b. These extreme
cases are considered in details in the next Section.
Contrary to p1, which is valid only at peculiar sets of
values for (a, b, k), p2 is always a valid fixed point. Indeed
it is the unique attractor of the dynamics driven by Eq.
(5). This feature is rather important since it discards the
initial conditions in the making of the opinion dynamics
final outcome. The associated dynamics turns out to be a
threshold-less dynamics ending at a stable public opinion
characterized by p2. One illustration of the variation of
p2 as a function of k is shown in Figure (4) for a = 0.10
and b = 0.20 together with p1.
IV. THE EXTREME CASES OF BELIEFS AND
STUBBORNNESS
We investigate the extreme cases with respect to both
stubbornness and collective beliefs, i.e. we consider sep-
arately and combined the cases a = 0 (no stubbornness
on the A side), b = 0 (no stubbornness on the A side),
a = b (equal stubbornness on both sides), k = 0 (doubt-
ing yields to choose B) and k = 1 (doubting yields to
choose A).
Absence of stubbornness a = b = 0
When a = b = 0 the problem becomes rather simple.
Only the collective beliefs affect the opinion dynamics.
Eq. (4) reduces to
pt+1 = (1− 2k)p
2
t + 2kpt , (8)
which has two fixed points p¯1 = 0 and p¯2 = 1 for k 6=
1/2. For k < 1/2 the attractor is p¯1 = 0 with p¯2 = 1
being an unstable fixed point. The dynamics is reversed
at once when k > 1/2 with p¯1 = 0 being the unstable
fixed point towards the attractor located now at p¯2 = 1.
An illustration is shown in Figure (5) for the two cases
k = 0.30 and k = 0.90.
In the first case, an initial very large support p0 = 0.80
is found to shrink down to p5 = 0.37 after five updates
and to p7 = 0.20 after two additional updates since the
attractor is located at zero exhibited by a filled little
square. In contrast a minority initial support p0 = 0.20
is boosted up to p5 = 0.96 after five updates for k = 0.90.
The attractor is now located at one exhibited by a filled
little circle.
Indeed, above description misses a mathematical sin-
gularity in the nature of the fixed points, which is re-
vealed by increasing the k one-dimensional parameter
space to the three-dimensional parameter space {k, a, b}.
The interplay between the two fixed points monitoring
the dynamics happens to be subtle.
Using Eq. (8) yields the two fixed points p¯1 = 0 and
p¯2 = 1. Their stability analysis shows an exchange of
stability with p1 being the attractor for k < 1/2 against
p2 when k > 1/2 as exhibited in Figure (6).
However plugging a = b = 0 i.e., β = γ = 0 into Eq.
(6) reveals the existence of two subclasses of values for p1
and p2. Now p2 is always the attractor but when k < 1/2
we have p1 = 1 and p2 = 0 whereas p1 = 0 and p2 = 1 for
k > 1/2. The simultaneous exchange of values occurs at
k = 1/2. That singularity at k = 1/2 corresponds in the
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FIG. 5: The function pt+1 as a function of points pt for a =
b = 0 with k = 0.30 and k = 0.90. In the first case, an
initial very large support p0 = 0.80 is seen to shrink down
to p5 = 0.37 and p7 = 0.20. The attractor is located at zero
noticed by a filled little square. In contrast a minority initial
support p0 = 0.20 is shown to be boosted up to p5 = 0.96 for
k = 0.90. The attractor is now located at one noticed by a
filled little circle.
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FIG. 6: The two solutions p1 = 0 and p2 = 1 obtained from
Eq. (8) where p1 is the attractor for k < 1/2 against p2 when
k > 1/2
k one-dimensional plane to have all points invariant by
the dynamics. The exchange of values is shown in Figure
( 7).
In the absence of stubbornness it is thus enough to
defend an opinion which is just a little bit more consis-
tent with the collective beliefs to be sure to win out the
public debate provided an initial tiny cluster of floaters
supports that opinion. In others words, for opinion A to
have p0 = 0.01 with k = 0.52 guarantee to win the pub-
lic debate. However this victory is somehow academic
since many updates are required as shown by the series
p2
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kAttractor
Attractor
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
FIG. 7: The solutions from Eq. (6) where a = b = 0 i.e.,
β = γ = 0. A singularity is seen at k = 1/2 where p1 and p2
exchange simultaneously their respective values with p1 being
always the attractor.
p12 = 0.02 and p40 = 0.05. In that case, an initial sup-
port of p0 = 0.35 is required to reach the majority within
16 updates with p16 = 0.51, which is still too much to
be achieved with reasonable timescales of public debates.
On the other hand, to take more advantage of the collec-
tive beliefs with k = 0.60 ensure a strong victory within
4 updates with p4 = 0.54. From p0 = 0.01, 25 updates
are required with p25 = 0.51. But only seven creates a
jump to p7 = 0.58 with k = 0.95. To take advantage of
the collective beliefs is thus an incredible accelerator for
minority spreading.
One-sided stubbornness a = 0 with b 6= 0
From above case, next step is to consider the case with
one-sided inflexibles versus the effect of collective beliefs
briefly discussed in Subsection III B. Let us consider a =
0⇐⇒ β = 0 with b 6= 0. Eq. (4) becomes
pt+1 = (1− 2k)p
2
t + k(2− b)pt , (9)
which has two fixed points p¯1 = 0 and p¯2 = 1 +
bk
1−2k
for k 6= 1/2. Last fixed point is physical only within the
range 0 ≤ p¯2 ≤ (1− b), which requires both k > 1/2 and
k ≥ kb where kb ≡
1
2−b , which reduces to k ≥ kb with
b > 0 as found earlier. For 0 ≤ k ≤ kb, the unique valid
fixed point p¯1 = 0 is the attractor. Whatever are the
initial conditions, opinion A will eventually disappear.
In the range kb ≤ k < kv, the two fixed points monitor
the dynamics with now p¯2 being the attractor where kv ≡
1
2(1−b) . While opinion survives the debate it ends up as
minority against opinion B, which wins the debate. At
k = kv the two opinions stabilize at exactly fifty-fifty and
only for kv < k ≤ 1 does opinion A wins the debate. Four
cases are shown with b = 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40 are shown
in Figure (8).
However, starting from Eq. (9) hampers the visualiza-
tion of the subtle interplay between the two fixed points
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FIG. 8: The two solutions p¯1 = 0 and p¯2 = 1+
bk
1−2k
from Eq.
(9) where a = 0 i.e., β = 0 and a fixed value of b 6= 0. Four
cases are shown with b = 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40. For k < kb
where kb ≡
1
2−b
, p¯1 = 0 is the attractor and p2 is non physical
against p2 as the attractor when k > kb with p1 becoming
unstable. Only for k > kv where kv ≡
1
2(1−b)
opinion A wins
the debate.
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FIG. 9: The solution p1 as a function of k from Eq. (6) for
a = 0 i.e., β = 0 and a fixed value of b 6= 0. Four cases are
shown with b = 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40. In the range 0 < k < kb
where kb ≡
1
2−b
, p1 is not physical. At k = 0 the value p1 = 1
is a fixed point only for b = 0. For kb ≤ k ≤ 1, p1 = 0 is an
unstable fixed point.
obtained from Eq. (6) with a = 0 as found in the prece-
dent case a = b = 0. At k = 0 the fixed point p1 = 1 is
valid only for b = 0 to satisfy p1 ≤ 1−b and p2 = 0 is the
attractor. For 0 < k < kb the solution p1 is not physical
with p2 = 0 still being the attractor. At k = kb we have
p1 = p2 = 0. From k > kb the attractor p2 turns non
zero with p1 = 0 becoming an unstable fixed point. At
k = 1 we have p1 = 0 and p2 = 1− b. Both results for p1
and p2 are exhibited in Figures (9) and (10) respectively
for the four cases b = 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40. The attractor
p2 turns fifty-fifty at k = kv. For k > kv opinion A wins
the debate. Figure (11) includes both fixed points and is
to be compared with Figure (8).
In summary, given a proportion b of stubbornness on
the B opinion side, a stubbornness free A opinion must
benefit from a bias of the collective beliefs larger than kb
k
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FIG. 10: The attractor p2 as a function of k from Eq. (6)
where a = 0 i.e., β = 0 and a fixed value of b 6= 0. Four
cases are shown with b = 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40. In the range
0 ≤ k ≤ kb where kb ≡
1
2−b
, p2 = 0. For kb < k < 1, p2 6= 0
with p2 > 1/2 when k > kv ≡
1
2(1−b)
. At k = 1, p2 = 1− b.
p2 p1
kb
k
p1
kv
b=0.10
b=0.40
b=0.40
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
FIG. 11: The combination of both Figures (9) and (10) show-
ing the solutions p1 and p2 as a function of k from Eq. (6)
with a = 0 i.e., β = 0 and a fixed value of b 6= 0. Four cases
are shown with b = 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40. To be compared
with Figures (8) where the solutions p¯1 and p¯2 from Eq. (9).
not to be completely swept away. In order to win the
debate, the A opinion must flow towards an attractor p2
satisfying p2 > 1/2, which is achieved for k > kv ≡ 1/(2−
2b). The last constraint illustrates how to compensate
stubbornness with collective beliefs and vice versa. Given
a fixed value k, A looses the debate as soon as b < bv ≡
1 − 12k . The opinion landscape is shown in Figure (12).
Only limited areas allow a A victory.
One-sided stubbornness a 6= 0 with b = 0
Since we are studying the topology of the dynamics
landscape from the A opinion perspective it is worth to
investigate the reverse situation where stubbornness is
present only on the A side, i.e., a 6= 0 with b = 0. It
is a symmetry change with respect to the precedent case
a = 0 i.e., β = 0. However, analyzing the equivalent of
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FIG. 12: Case a = 0. Given b the upper part shows the
minimum value of collective beliefs required for A to win the
debate with k > kv where kv ≡ 1/(2 − 2b). For k < kv A is
defeated. Given k the lower part shows the maximum value
of B stubbornness which allows a A victory with b < bv where
bv ≡ 1−
1
2k
. A looses the debate for b > bv.
Figures (9, 10, 11) shown in Figures (13, 14, 15) sheds
light on the appropriate strategy to be implemented by
the A advocates in such a case. Only the results are
given.
As seen from Figure (13) the solution p1 = 1 is a valid
unstable fixed point in the range 0 ≤ k ≤ ka where ka =
1− 12−a . Otherwise it is non physical with p1 > 1 for ka <
k < 12 and p1 < 0 for
1
2 < k < 1, besides at k = 1 when
a = 0 for which p1 = 0. For a = 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40 we
have ka = 0.47, 0.44, 0.41, 0.37.
In contrast, the attractor p2 is always valid. In the
range 0 ≤ k < kv where kv =
1−a
2−a , p2 <
1
2 , which means
the A opinion eventually looses the debate. At k = 0,
p2 = a. At k = kv the attractor is exactly at fifty-
fifty and only for k > kv does the A opinion wins the
public debate independently of the initial conditions as
exhibited in Figure (14). When ka ≤ k ≤ 1 we have
p2 = 1, which means the B opinion will disappear in
principle.
The complete dynamics landscape is shown in Figure
(15). It combines both Figures (13) and (14).
Given a proportion a of stubbornness on its side, the A
k
p1
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FIG. 13: The solution p1 as a function of k from Eq. (6) for
b = 0 i.e., γ = 0 and a fixed value of a 6= 0. Four cases are
shown with a = 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40. In the range 0 ≤ k ≤ ka
where ka ≡ 1 −
1
2−a
, p1 = 1 is an unstable fixed point. For
ka < k < 1, p1 is not physical. The value p1 = 0 at k = 1 is
valid only for a = 0.
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FIG. 14: The attractor p2 as a function of k from Eq. (6)
where b = 0 i.e., γ = 0 and a fixed value of a 6= 0. Four
cases are shown with a = 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40. In the range
0 ≤ k < ka where ka ≡ 1 −
1
2−a
, p2 6= 1. At k = 0, p2 = a.
For 0 ≤ k < kv where kv = 1−
1
2(1−a)
, p2 <
1
2
. At k = kv the
attractor is exactly at fifty-fifty and only for k > kv does the
A opinion wins the public debate with p2 >
1
2
. In the range
ka ≤ k ≤ 1, p2 = 1 which means the B opinion will disappear
in principle.
opinion can afford to be in part counter beliefs provided
k > kv. The larger a, the lower kv as shown in Figure
(16). From kv = 1−
1
2(1−a) we get av = 1−
1
2(1−k) , which
yields the minimum value of stubbornness required for
opinion A to overcome a collective beliefs characterized
with a fixed value k < 12 , i.e, mainly opposite to it. The
dependences of kv on a and of av on k are identical as
illustrated in Figure (16). Given a (k), we need k > kv
(a > av) to have p2 > 1/2. These constraints illustrate
how to compensate stubbornness with collective beliefs
and vice versa.
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FIG. 15: The combination of both Figures (13) and (14) show-
ing the solutions p1 and p2 as a function of k from Eq. (6)
with a 6= 0 and b = 0 i.e., γ = 0. Four cases are shown with
a = 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40.
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FIG. 16: Case b = 0. Given a fixed value of a (k) A wins
the debate for k > kv (a > av) where kv ≡ 1/(2 − 2b) and
av ≡ 1/(2− 2k).
Extreme cases k = 0 and k = 1
Plugging k = 0 into Eq. (4) reduces to,
pt+1 = p
2
t − apt + a , (10)
which yields two fixed points located respectively at 1
and a with the second one being the attractor. Every
agent ends up sharing opinion B besides the proportion
a of inflexibles sharing opinion A.
At the other extreme with k = 1 Eq. (4) becomes,
pt+1 = p
2
t (1− b)pt , (11)
which yields two fixed points located respectively at 0 and
(1 − b) with the second one being the attractor. Every
agent ends up sharing opinion A besides the proportion
b of inflexibles sharing opinion B.
V. THE GENERAL LANDSCAPE OF THE
WINNING OPINION STRATEGY
We are now in a position to build the three dimensional
(k, a, b) landscape of the opinion dynamic flow monitored
by the dependence of the two fixed points p1 and p2 on
these three independent parameters. Knowing that p2
is the attractor, the domain of validity of p1 being in-
deed very limited, we can exhibit some two-dimensional
plans. Figure (17) shows respectively the variation of
p1, p2 and (p1, p2) as a function of k for the 4 cases
b = 0, 0.10, 0.20, 0.50 with a = 0.20. The symmetric
situation with a = 0, 0.10, 0.20, 0.50 with b = 0.20 is ex-
hibited in Figure (18).
In particular we can determine the critical surface
where both opinions reach an attractor located at ex-
actly fifty-fifty solving pt = 1/2 using Eq. (4). It yields
kv =
1− 2a
2(1− a− b)
. (12)
This surface delimits both space for which opinion A
respectively looses and wins the public debate indepen-
dently of the initial proportions of floaters supporting A
or B and is exhibited in Figure (19).
However the time scale to modify collective beliefs is
much longer than the one to build inflexibles, the instru-
mental formula is therefore to have a as a function of
both k and b. It is obtained reversing Eq. (12) with
av =
1− 2k + 2bk
2(1− k)
. (13)
It is exhibited in Figure (20).
Both Figures (19) and (20) determine the geometry
of the winning outcomes for a public debate between A
and B, which are independent of the initial floater pro-
portions. The practical highlight to eventually win out a
public debate is to emphasize the fact that it is a single
attractor dynamics. Accordingly, what matters in the
conduct of a public debate from the A perspective is to
achieve p2 > 1/2. Then, for any initial support p, opinion
A is certain to win no matters how low support A has at
the beginning of the debate. Accordingly p2 > 1/2 when
k > kv for fixed a and b and for a > av for fixed k and b.
The symmetric formula to determine the B best strat-
egy is to have b as a function of both k and a with
bv =
−1 + 2k + 2a(1− k)
2k
. (14)
VI. APPLICATION TO THE GLOBAL
WARMING ISSUE
Above mechanisms may enlighten some aspects of the
current on going public debate about global warming,
which is a public issue with an important controversial
impact [22–28]. The debate articulates around two com-
peting opinions. The first opinion (A) states that the
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FIG. 17: Both functions p1 and p2 as a function of k respec-
tively for the 4 cases b = 0, 0.10, 0.20, 0.50 with a = 0.20.
Only p1 in the upper part, only p2 in the middle part and p1
and p2 in the lower part.
recently observed global warming is man-made while the
second opinion (B) dismisses that claim emphasizing that
climatology is not yet a well established hard science.
Opinion A holders assess that we are heading towards an
unprecedented catastrophe in case we do not curb dras-
tically green gas emissions. In contrast, opinion B sup-
porters note that current climate is not worrying with
respect to historical past situations.
In case of a doubt about the cause of the global warm-
ing, the general belief shared by a large majority of the
public is that man activities are triggering very negative
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FIG. 18: Both functions p1 and p2 as a function of k respec-
tively for the 4 cases a = 0, 0.10, 0.20, 0.50 with b = 0.20.
Only p1 in the upper part, only p2 in the middle part and p1
and p2 in the lower part.
impacts on our environment as well against the bio di-
versity. According most agents chose opinion A in case
of non conclusive arguments about the actual cause of
observed global warming. The result of that situation
is a value of the bias k > 1/2 which favors opinion A.
It means that in absence of inflexibles, the public de-
bate drives inexorably the whole population towards an
extremism state with everyone sharing the man made ex-
planation.
In addition a substantial fraction of agents are con-
vinced by the IPCC claims that the man made cause is
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FIG. 19: The critical surface kv as a function of a and b.
When k > kv opinion A wins the debate. Otherwise it looses.
The plane k = 1/2 is also shown. Only the physical region
a+ b ≤ 1 is exhibited.
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FIG. 20: The critical surface av as a function of k and b.
When a > av opinion A wins the debate. Otherwise it looses.
The plane a = 1 − b is also shown. Only the region where
a ≤ 1− b is valid.
scientifically proved. Accordingly we have a 6= 0. In con-
trast B opinion holders are less inclined to be inflexibles
since they are supporting a claim. They are only not
convinced that A is true. It is also more difficult to con-
vince someone to adopt B since it does not provide an an
alternative view to A. We can thus infer that b 6= 0 but
with the condition b << a.
The two conditions k > 1/2 and b << a makes im-
possible a victory of the B opinion. To win the debate,
i.e., to reach more than fifty percent support within the
public, the B holders must satisfy b > bv since at b = bv
the attractor locates precisely at fifty percent. Otherwise
the A opinion is victorious.
Figure 21 shows the function bv as a function of the
a
bv
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B looses
k=0.70
B wins
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FIG. 21: The critical line bv as a function of a for the two
cases k = 0.70 (favors A) and k = 0.30 (favors B). When
k = 0.70 to overcome this bias in favor of A, B needs to build
a rather large fraction of inflexibles within the upper grey
triangle. Outside this area B is certain to loose the debate.
The case k = 0.30, which favors B, yields a large area for a
B victory. Only within the lower grey triangle does B looses
the debate.
proportion a of A inflexibles for the two cases k = 0.70
(favors A) and k = 0.30 (favors B). When k = 0.70 col-
lective beliefs induce a bias in favor of opinion A. Then,
to overcome this bias opinion B needs to build a rather
large fraction of inflexibles as seen from the Figure. In
addition it requires to satisfy the condition b >> a, which
is totally unrealistic.
The eventual reduction in A inflexibles is still with-
out effect on the final outcome since at a = 0 we have
bv = 0.29. To win the debate, the B opinion must trans-
form a large fraction of floaters into stubborn agents.
Such a goal could be achieved by solving the question
scientifically, which is far out of reach at the moment.
However this result has to be tempered by the fact that
in reality agents do not discuss only by pairs. Including
larger sizes groups create the possibility to have a two at-
tractor dynamics with a tipping threshold, which in turn
makes possible to opinion B to overcome the collective
beliefs biased against it.
In these conditions, only via a broad campaign among
the public with large discussing groups, could opinion
B take advantage of the recent repeated drawbacks suf-
fered by the man made global warming holders. From
the current reduction in public support towards opinion
A, opinion B holders should keep on their activism to
hold debates on the issue. Otherwise, we could infer that
the recent A setbacks suffered by the man made global
warming holders, which have resulted in a weakening of
the public support, will be forgotten, and the driving
force of the collective beliefs will lead again the public
along a strong support of opinion A [22–28].
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VII. CONCLUSION
Our results hint on how to design possible strategies to
win a public debate. In particular it has shown how the
existence of collective beliefs is a major factor in the di-
rection taken by a public debate. To counter balance this
strong bias, the making of inflexibles is efficient but re-
quires a substantial fraction of them as seen from Figure
(21).
Since the collective beliefs are not given to modifica-
tions within short timescales, the best approach for one
opinion to win is to focus on getting as many as pos-
sible inflexibles along its side. However this goal could
demand to overstate the validity of some arguments to
sustain and legitimate that opinion. In contrast, such a
behavior could rise ethical questions. At the time it is of
importance to prevent the formation of inflexibles on the
other side by questioning the validity of the assessments
used to promote it.
To conclude our analysis shed some new light on the
possible laws, which govern the evolution of a public de-
bate. It emphasize the role of global frame like the col-
lective beliefs as well as individual features of the agents
like stubbornness.
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that we have
dealing with a model, which aims to grasp some part
of the reality, but which is not the reality. We did not
present a formal proof of some opinion dynamics but
we have developed a novel angle to look at public de-
bates, which could produce drastic changes in the design
of lobby strategies.
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